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3 month old 737-9 Max depressurisation incident

YorkRailFan

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Can anything save Boeing from its management? The recent high-profile near-disaster involving an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 MAX is just another small step in Boeing’s downward spiral, and it is far from clear what will arrest it.

The safety concerns and manufacturing errors plaguing the company’s jetliner unit are just part of the problem. The production ramp-up has been a series of disappointments that will only worsen as regulators and customers scrutinize manufacturing and inspection processes.

The company is also quickly losing market share. CEO Dave Calhoun’s November 2022 announcement that there would be no new Boeing jetliner this decade had a predictable result: a record 1,300 Airbus A321neo orders in 2023. Boeing will be very lucky to retain 40% of the market by decade’s end. Given relentless cost-cutting and the demographics of the engineering workforce, it will be quite difficult for the company to create a new jetliner in the 2030s.

The situation may be worse on the defense side. Billions of dollars have been lost due to poor execution and ill-advised fixed-price contracts—over $2 billion in 2022 alone. While an E-7 procurement program may help, these losses will not stop anytime soon. Worse, it is unlikely that the Pentagon will trust Boeing with the next-generation platforms—NGAD and F/A-XX—being decided in the next few years.

For years, Boeing management was accused of focusing on money rather than products, performance or people. Between 2014 and 2018, it gave away $53 billion in dividends and buybacks. But that shareholder focus no longer works. Boeing is the only large-cap aerospace company in the world with a flat share price throughout the remarkable demand surge the industry has seen over the last three years.

As 2023 ended, the company’s strategy department was abolished. Unit strategy functions were also reduced. The company no longer wants a plan for company-wide new technology development, new product development or, most crucial, restoring the links between the people who design and build aircraft and the people who manage the company. There are also no plans to promote technical people to senior management positions. Stephanie Pope’s recent appointment as chief operating officer means another finance person has been made Calhoun’s heir apparent.

The future, if it can be called that, is simply to run the company for cash—deliver legacy jets, try to make existing defense programs profitable, and resume converting cash flow into shareholder returns. Management may also try to sell off parts of the company—or perhaps all of it. The implications of this for the U.S. aerospace industry, defense industrial base and even the broader economy are potentially enormous.

What can change the company’s path? Strangely, there have been no indications that either activist investors or the company’s own board will act. Airlines and lessors are angry and getting angrier, but given long waiting times at Airbus, Boeing management likely feels that it will not see any wholesale customer defections. The most airlines could do is encourage Embraer to enter the larger jet market, but that would take at least a decade.

That leaves the U.S. government. But in general, the U.S. does not do industrial policy. In fact, the U.S. is the only large country to let its de facto flag carrier (Pan Am) go out of business. NASA can provide some limited cash for design concepts such as the X-66, but that is not the same as creating a new product to compete with Airbus, let alone transform a dysfunctional company culture. There will be additional regulatory oversight from the FAA, but the agency is also underresourced.

It would be one thing if Boeing needed a government cash injection or a loan guarantee, as with the automakers in 2008 or Lockheed in 1971. This is different—Boeing simply wants to give away its money (when it starts making it again). There is no known U.S. mechanism to stop that.

As for potential Pentagon influence, industrial base concerns are not a criterion for source selection. Again, the services do not want to take a chance on poor execution. A new C-X strategic transport program might help Boeing, but others could bid, too. One thing the Pentagon can be expected to do is encourage new large aircraft competitors. That explains the Air Force’s $235 million prototype contract for JetZero and its partners, awarded in August. That is just a tiny fraction of what is needed to create a new aircraft, however, and this is an industry with some of the highest barriers to entry.

Thus, we may be witnessing the slow (but perhaps accelerating) demise of what was once the world’s greatest aerospace company, with few if any identifiable roadblocks to an act of self-immolation.

This paints an extremely dark picture for Boeing but shows that Boeing needs change, on the Management level, but also training issues on the engineer level. It also shows a fundamental fault in the US aerospace industry and the intervening of the US Government.
 
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edwin_m

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O'Leary knows he has no other real option apart from Boeing.


O'Leary also said this about Airbus as O'Leary walked away from a deal with Airbus in 2001. O'Leary is like Sir Tim Clark at Emirates, they both moan about certification delays but they can't pull out.


Ethiopian Airlines also had one of their 737-8s crash in 2019. Qantas and KLM also walked away from the 737 and ordered the A321neo.
I think if I was Airbus, with a big order backlog on A320 series from other airlines, I'd not be going out of my way to attract such an awkward customer as O'Leary.


Lots of questions here. Did Boeing discover loose bolts whilst testing the pressurisation on the aircraft? This obviously points more fingers at Boeing and that this is an installation issue. Spirit AeroSystems shouldn't think that they're getting scot-free though, as the FAA investigation isn't only surrounding the recent incident surrounding AS 1282, but also regarding recent QA issues at both Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems.
The pressurisation test won't detect loose or missing bolts. When the door is in the normal position it is held in place by the internal pressure, and when in place the seal also prevents the pressure escaping. The bolts keep it in that position. Without the bolts it seems to me the door might still stay in place, but it is at risk of moving. I suspect the sequence of events included some disturbance such as a hard landing or turbulence, probably when there was little or no positive cabin pressure. This would have allowed the door to move partly out of position, generating some pressure alarms, and then to move far enough that there was no restraint to prevent it blowing out.

The only way the bolts can be checked is to remove the interior panel and confirm they are present and correctly tightened.
 

YorkRailFan

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I think if I was Airbus, with a big order backlog on A320 series from other airlines, I'd not be going out of my way to attract such an awkward customer as O'Leary.
I certainly agree.



The pressurisation test won't detect loose or missing bolts. When the door is in the normal position it is held in place by the internal pressure, and when in place the seal also prevents the pressure escaping. The bolts keep it in that position. Without the bolts it seems to me the door might still stay in place, but it is at risk of moving. I suspect the sequence of events included some disturbance such as a hard landing or turbulence, probably when there was little or no positive cabin pressure. This would have allowed the door to move partly out of position, generating some pressure alarms, and then to move far enough that there was no restraint to prevent it blowing out.

The only way the bolts can be checked is to remove the interior panel and confirm they are present and correctly tightened.
Without washers, the pressurisation test could allow for loose bolts to come out hence making the door loose. Alaska and United have both found loose bolts and washers, as has an unnamed Indian carrier.
 

DustyBin

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The pressurisation test won't detect loose or missing bolts. When the door is in the normal position it is held in place by the internal pressure, and when in place the seal also prevents the pressure escaping. The bolts keep it in that position. Without the bolts it seems to me the door might still stay in place, but it is at risk of moving. I suspect the sequence of events included some disturbance such as a hard landing or turbulence, probably when there was little or no positive cabin pressure. This would have allowed the door to move partly out of position, generating some pressure alarms, and then to move far enough that there was no restraint to prevent it blowing out.

I think this is almost certainly what happened. The bolts aren't under any load, they simply stop the door moving upwards as you say.

Looking at the diagrams, the assembly comprises a bolt, a castellated nut, and a split pin. It seems incredible (although not impossible) that the bolts were missing altogether following assembly/reassembly, but if the split pins weren't installed the nuts would work their way along the bolts before falling off altogether. You then have bolts free to move and eventually fall out, leaving the door able to move into the open position (it's spring assisted so isn't held down by it's own full weight).

The bolts are a simple solution and there are four of them, so I maintain that this is a QC/training issue as opposed to a poor design.
 

Peter Mugridge

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This paints an extremely dark picture for Boeing but shows that Boeing needs change, on the Management level, but also training issues on the engineer level. It also shows a fundamental fault in the US aerospace industry and the intervening of the US Government.
One of the best things Boeing could do would be to ditch the third party back office subcontractor they use and take control of all their paperwork back in house. That would allow a far better oversight of things on the administrative side and allow people who actually know what they are looking at to check details instead of having it being effectively done on a tick box checklist by people who won't recognise if any of the details look wrong - especially on specifications and checks.

That would particularly show up in the case of quality control - which is an area in which Boeing seems to have ongoing issues for the past decade; funnily enough that's roughly when they hived the back office functions out to the third party company. That cannot be a coincidence.
 

najaB

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The bolts are a simple solution and there are four of them, so I maintain that this is a QC/training issue as opposed to a poor design.
Agreed. A definite example of the KISS principle. Unfortunately they don't seem to have applied similarly basic controls to the manufacturing process.

For example, giving workers exactly the number of bolts and pins as they need to complete the task. If they get to the end of the job and have some left over, or run out before they finish the job then they know something has gone wrong.
 

DanNCL

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O'Leary knows he has no other real option apart from Boeing.


O'Leary also said this about Airbus as O'Leary walked away from a deal with Airbus in 2001. O'Leary is like Sir Tim Clark at Emirates, they both moan about certification delays but they can't pull out.


Ethiopian Airlines also had one of their 737-8s crash in 2019. Qantas and KLM also walked away from the 737 and ordered the A321neo.
I don’t think something that happened in 2001 is really likely to stop an airline from going to Airbus. Even 2020 was 4 years ago and the world was in a very different place.
Short-mid term Ryanair may well be stuck with the MAX but long term they can switch, either to the A320 or (if/when certified in the west) the C919.
There is of course the second hand market too, and as a last resort Ryanair could retain older 737s longer.

Ethiopian weren’t that big a customer and KLM switching to Airbus isn’t really a surprise considering their French ownership. Qantas is more surprising, especially as they’ve been customers of both ‘original’ Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.

However, it remains to be seen how long it will take for the C919 to be delivered in larger volumes.
Additionally, no Chinese airline seems to have anything older than a 737-700, so most aren't in urgent need of replacement.
I think we might see quite a few Embraer orders for full-service airlines in the West though
Once they’re confident in its safety and reliability I think they’ll ramp up C919 production to a large scale. It’s a very capable aircraft and one with a large market potential, especially with Boeing having issues with the MAX and Airbus not having capacity to build planes for everyone.

The Embraer E2 Jets haven’t sold very well. KLM have them but few others have, most of the previous Embraer customers have gone for the A220 instead.
 

edwin_m

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Without washers, the pressurisation test could allow for loose bolts to come out hence making the door loose. Alaska and United have both found loose bolts and washers, as has an unnamed Indian carrier.
The application of internal pressure doesn't create any forces that would make the bolts fall out or even come loose. If the door is trying to depart from its normal position it will be pressing on the side of the bolts, not acting to push them out. The lower bolts may even have some sideways pinching on them from the forces acting on the two concentric tubes they are inserted through, but that could be close to zero if the upwards spring force is similar to the weight of the door.
 

Bletchleyite

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The application of internal pressure doesn't create any forces that would make the bolts fall out or even come loose. If the door is trying to depart from its normal position it will be pressing on the side of the bolts, not acting to push them out. The lower bolts may even have some sideways pinching on them from the forces acting on the two concentric tubes they are inserted through, but that could be close to zero if the upwards spring force is similar to the weight of the door.

Pressurising and depressurising (and general flight) causes some deformation in the airframe - this is very visible in something big like a 747 in turbulence - you see the ceiling panels shifting around as it does. That deformation can cause a bolt that isn't properly secured to work loose over time.
 

edwin_m

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Pressurising and depressurising (and general flight) causes some deformation in the airframe - this is very visible in something big like a 747 in turbulence - you see the ceiling panels shifting around as it does. That deformation can cause a bolt that isn't properly secured to work loose over time.
Maybe so, but a single pressurisation test wouldn't show anything wrong with the bolts unless all four had completely disappeared and the door had started to move away from its normal position.
 

YorkRailFan

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I don’t think something that happened in 2001 is really likely to stop an airline from going to Airbus. Even 2020 was 4 years ago and the world was in a very different place.
Short-mid term Ryanair may well be stuck with the MAX but long term they can switch, either to the A320 or (if/when certified in the west) the C919.
There is of course the second hand market too, and as a last resort Ryanair could retain older 737s longer.

Ethiopian weren’t that big a customer and KLM switching to Airbus isn’t really a surprise considering their French ownership. Qantas is more surprising, especially as they’ve been customers of both ‘original’ Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.
The problem is that Airbus doesn't want to do business with Ryanair.

The application of internal pressure doesn't create any forces that would make the bolts fall out or even come loose. If the door is trying to depart from its normal position it will be pressing on the side of the bolts, not acting to push them out. The lower bolts may even have some sideways pinching on them from the forces acting on the two concentric tubes they are inserted through, but that could be close to zero if the upwards spring force is similar to the weight of the door.
Your comment paints a very different picture to this video.
 

YorkRailFan

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As investigations continue into the Jan. 5 inflight loss of an exit door plug on an Alaska Airlines 737-9, the FAA has taken the extraordinary step of denying Boeing permission to continue with its planned production increase of the twinjet.

The action, which comes as Boeing is in the midst of ramping up 737 production at its Renton site as well as standing up a new assembly line in Everett, Washington, is part of a broader FAA reaction to the recent incident, which was triggered by a serious lapse in the manufacturer’s quality control processes.

In a Jan. 24 statement, the FAA says it “informed Boeing it will not grant any production expansion of the MAX, including the 737-9 MAX. This action comes on top of the FAA’s investigation and ramped up oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. The FAA today also approved a thorough inspection and maintenance process that must be performed on each of the grounded 171 Boeing 737-9 MAX aircraft. Upon successful completion, the aircraft will be eligible to return to service.”

The FAA’s action is a major blow to Boeing’s plans to raise 737 MAX production beyond its current level of around 38 aircraft per month. The manufacturer ultimately aims to reach 50 aircraft per month by 2025/2026. The FAA’s move also casts a strong shadow over the final certification timeline of the final two MAX derivatives—the 737-7 and the stretched 737-10. Final approval for the -7 was thought to be imminent at the start of the year while type inspection authorization for the -10 was approved in November 2023.

Commenting on the agency’s hard line, FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker says that although he is confident the 737-9s can be inspected prior to returning to service, “this won’t be back to business as usual for Boeing. We will not agree to any request from Boeing for an expansion in production or approve additional production lines for the 737 MAX until we are satisfied that the quality control issues uncovered during this process are resolved.”

The FAA’s approved inspection and maintenance process will require an inspection of specific bolts, guide tracks, and fittings around the door plug as well as detailed visual inspections of left and right mid-cabin exit door plugs and “dozens” of associated components, says the agency. The inspection will also include retorquing fasteners and correcting any damage or abnormal conditions.

The FAA says the new instructions come after a review of data from 40 inspections of grounded aircraft. The FAA also convened a Corrective Action Review Board (CARB). The CARB, made up of safety experts, scrutinized and approved the inspection and maintenance process.

In a statement following FAA’s directive, Boeing said, “We will continue to cooperate fully and transparently with the FAA and follow their direction as we take action to strengthen safety and quality at Boeing. We will also work closely with our airline customers as they complete the required inspection procedures to safely return their 737-9 airplanes to service.”

Work Pauses​

Boeing meanwhile says it will hold a series of “quality stand downs,” pausing work at factories and fabrication sites for sessions focused on quality and improvement. The first session will be held Jan. 25, with Boeing’s 737 factory teams in Renton, Wash.

“Production, delivery and support efforts will pause for a day so teammates can take part in working sessions focused on quality,” a communication to Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) employees explains. “The sessions allow all teammates who touch the airplane to pause, evaluate what we’re doing, how we’re doing it, and make recommendations for improvement.”

As part of the safety effort, the “quality stand down” sessions will take place across all the company’s commercial aircraft factories and fabrication sites. Sessions will include “hands-on learning, reflection, and collaboration to identify where quality and compliance can be improved and create actionable plans that will be tracked to closure,” BCA detailed.

The work pauses come as the OEM faces scrutiny for its second MAX family grounding within a period of five years, in this instance stemming from the Jan. 5 737-9 Alaska Airlines door plug blowout. The incident, with no reported serious injuries, caused mandated and still-in-effect groundings for all -9s configured with the plug. Preliminary inspections by Alaska and United Airlines, the two U.S. airlines operating the variant, have confirmed finding loose hardware on some aircraft.

After the FAA announced its approved inspection process, United—the largest operator of the variant with 79—said it was preparing aircraft to return to scheduled service beginning on Jan. 28. “We will only return each MAX 9 aircraft to service once this thorough inspection process is complete,” the airline said in a statement. Alaska, which has 65 MAX 9s in its fleet, now expects to bring its first few back into scheduled commercial service on Jan. 26, anticipating inspections to take up to 12 hours for each plane. “We expect inspections on all our 737-9 MAX to be completed over the next week,” Alaska said.

The FAA on Jan. 17 began reviewing data from 40 737-9 door plug assembly inspections conducted by Alaska and United. It is also investigating Boeing’s manufacturing practices and production lines, with its top official describing “boots on the ground” manpower in a Jan. 23 update to CNBC.

“We’re shifting from more of an audit approach to a direct inspection approach,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said in the interview. He did not rule out the possibility of additional external oversight, should the agency’s findings indicate a need for “a third party, a nonprofit technical organization, to provide a fresh set of eyes,” he told the news outlet.

“The safety of the flying public, not speed, will determine the timeline for returning these aircraft to service,” the agency has said.

Production Line Woes​

According to a posting on a Boeing employee forum by an unidentified individual, manufacturing quality problems concerning the Alaska Airlines 737-9, line number 8789, were unearthed on the Renton production line at the end of August 2023 and early September 2023 when an inspection discovered damaged or improperly installed rivets around the left-hand mid-exit door. Further investigations with Spirit AeroSystems—the supplier of the fuselage—revealed the pressure seal which plugs the gap between the door plug and the fuselage door frame was also damaged and needed to be replaced. To replace the pressure seal, the door plug had to be opened or removed, which would require the retaining bolts holding the panel in place be removed.

In the post, the employee alleges that—presumably owing to pressure to keep the production line flowing at pace—the line workers repaired the rivets and pressure seal but did not log the fact that the door had been opened or removed in the manufacturing process system. Logging the door removal in the system—known as CMES (common manufacturing execution system)—would have automatically triggered a quality assurance inspection that would have slowed production, but which would also almost certainly have discovered the retaining bolts were either missing or loose.

Boeing’s CMES is a software system that monitors, tracks, documents, and controls the process of manufacturing through the entire production life cycle. The company also uses a second system called SAT (shipside action tracker), which is a database used by assembly workers to investigate, monitor, and resolve any manufacturing build issues. According to the former employee, the sequence of events concerning the replacement of the rivets and seal was documented in the SAT, and the non-conformance issues noted in the CMES. However, neither of the systems subsequently flagged up the record of missing bolts or the need for verification, thereby revealing serious potential safety and build quality weaknesses with the monitoring systems.

According to information provided to Aviation Week, the aircraft involved in the incident, N704AL, made its first flight on Oct. 15, 2023, just 45 days after the issue with the left-hand mid-exit door was flagged in the factory inspection. The aircraft flew a second Boeing production flight on Oct. 22, 2023, before making its first customer acceptance flight with Alaska five days later, and a second customer acceptance flight the following day. The delivery flight to Alaska took place Oct. 31, 2023.

Boeing’s recently announced quality stand down sessions are part of a multi-pronged improvement plan that includes an independent review of its quality system and supplier oversight led by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Kirkland (Kirk) Donald. The OEM is also cooperating with ongoing FAA and NTSB investigations.

“We have let down our airline customers and are deeply sorry for the significant disruption to them, their employees and their passengers,” BCA President and CEO Stan Deal said Jan. 23. “We are taking action on a comprehensive plan to bring these airplanes safely back to service and to improve our quality and delivery performance.”
That will take a hit on Boeing's Q1 earnings and will further increase Airbus' lead over Boeing in terms of yearly deliveries. It also means Boeing can say bye bye to the 737 production line at Everret for the time being.
 

YorkRailFan

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One of the best things Boeing could do would be to ditch the third party back office subcontractor they use and take control of all their paperwork back in house. That would allow a far better oversight of things on the administrative side and allow people who actually know what they are looking at to check details instead of having it being effectively done on a tick box checklist by people who won't recognise if any of the details look wrong - especially on specifications and checks.

That would particularly show up in the case of quality control - which is an area in which Boeing seems to have ongoing issues for the past decade; funnily enough that's roughly when they hived the back office functions out to the third party company. That cannot be a coincidence.
There's an excellent article in the Air Current about Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems' strained relationship. But the short of it is, Spirit Aerosystems also makes parts for Airbus at a facility in Prestwick, Scotland and there is a difficulty regarding unions.
 

najaB

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Pressurising and depressurising (and general flight) causes some deformation in the airframe - this is very visible in something big like a 747 in turbulence - you see the ceiling panels shifting around as it does. That deformation can cause a bolt that isn't properly secured to work loose over time.
indeed. That's exactly why the retaining pins are so important. If they aren't installed then the bolts could work loose over repeated pressurisation cycles. The fact that the incident aircraft was relatively new points to those pins not being installed in the first place.
 

Greybeard33

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The bolts are a simple solution and there are four of them, so I maintain that this is a QC/training issue as opposed to a poor design.
A basic principle of aircraft design is "foolproofing". Similar parts must be designed with differences such that it is not physically possible to fit the wrong part in the wrong place or in the wrong orientation.

In this case, the "door plug" fits in the same doorframe with the same hinge mechanism as the operational emergency exit door that is on other versions of the Max 9. The only difference is that the locking bolts must be installed if it is a plug, but must not be installed if it is a proper door (which has a separate latch mechanism to hold it closed).

Assembly line mechanics who work on both versions of the aircraft will be used to seeing empty holes with no locking bolts in them and so conceivably might overlook missing bolts when working on an aircraft with a plug.

Therefore I would say this is a design issue as well as a QC/training issue. The door plug should have been designed so that it was not physically possible for it to remain closed without being locked.
 

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A basic principle of aircraft design is "foolproofing". Similar parts must be designed with differences such that it is not physically possible to fit the wrong part in the wrong place or in the wrong orientation.

In this case, the "door plug" fits in the same doorframe with the same hinge mechanism as the operational emergency exit door that is on other versions of the Max 9. The only difference is that the locking bolts must be installed if it is a plug, but must not be installed if it is a proper door (which has a separate latch mechanism to hold it closed).

Assembly line mechanics who work on both versions of the aircraft will be used to seeing empty holes with no locking bolts in them and so conceivably might overlook missing bolts when working on an aircraft with a plug.

Therefore I would say this is a design issue as well as a QC/training issue. The door plug should have been designed so that it was not physically possible for it to remain closed without being locked.

I don't disagree with you in principle, but the whole point of the "plug" is that it can be converted into a door relatively easily, so a degree of commonality is inevitable. As there are actually physical differences, it should be apparent whether or not the bolts need to be installed (which they may well have been, albeit incorrectly).

You could argue that the underlying issue here is the need to offer this flexibility in the first place, and whether it's a case of commercial considerations leading to sub-optimal design/engineering outcomes. We're talking about the MAX here after all! ;)
 

edwin_m

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A basic principle of aircraft design is "foolproofing". Similar parts must be designed with differences such that it is not physically possible to fit the wrong part in the wrong place or in the wrong orientation.

In this case, the "door plug" fits in the same doorframe with the same hinge mechanism as the operational emergency exit door that is on other versions of the Max 9. The only difference is that the locking bolts must be installed if it is a plug, but must not be installed if it is a proper door (which has a separate latch mechanism to hold it closed).

Assembly line mechanics who work on both versions of the aircraft will be used to seeing empty holes with no locking bolts in them and so conceivably might overlook missing bolts when working on an aircraft with a plug.

Therefore I would say this is a design issue as well as a QC/training issue. The door plug should have been designed so that it was not physically possible for it to remain closed without being locked.
The upper bolts go through holes in the guide track, which is part of the door plug. I haven't seen equivalent detail on the actual door, but I assume it has a similar guide track but it may not have holes.

The lower ones go through four holes in two telescoped tubes, one attached to the door and the other to the door frame. I think the one on the door is the outer one so even if the inner one has holes in all aircraft, the outer one on an actual door might not have holes. If both of those things are true then a fitted actual door would have no visible empty holes so the technicians would not be habituated to not fitting bolts in those holes.

A possible protection would be to supply the door plug with the nuts and bolts prominently attached in a bag. But there's a suggestion Boeing removed and re-attached the door during assembly, in which case they'd have to re-bag the parts to provide an equivalent reminder to whoever re-attached it.
 

Greybeard33

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I don't disagree with you in principle, but the whole point of the "plug" is that it can be converted into a door relatively easily, so a degree of commonality is inevitable. As there are actually physical differences, it should be apparent whether or not the bolts need to be installed (which they may well have been, albeit incorrectly).

You could argue that the underlying issue here is the need to offer this flexibility in the first place, and whether it's a case of commercial considerations leading to sub-optimal design/engineering outcomes. We're talking about the MAX here after all! ;)
Boeing in fact offers three options, an operational emergency exit door, a deactivated door (which has the handle covered over behind the trim) or the plug. They advise customers that they should choose the deactivated door if there is a possibility that an operational door will be required in future, because it is costly and time consuming to convert the plug to a door. However, the plug allows more space for seats in the cabin.

According to whistleblower statements quoted on Pprune forums, it seems that the bolts were removed on the Final Assembly Line in order to open the plug and replace a pressure seal, but there is no record in Boeing documentation that the bolts were subsequently confirmed reinstalled. Reportedly the quality system only required a repeat inspection if the plug had been removed, not if it had just been opened. And the plug was normally referred to as a "door" on the shop floor - doors do not require inspection after opening and closing.
 

DustyBin

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Boeing in fact offers three options, an operational emergency exit door, a deactivated door (which has the handle covered over behind the trim) or the plug. They advise customers that they should choose the deactivated door if there is a possibility that an operational door will be required in future, because it is costly and time consuming to convert the plug to a door. However, the plug allows more space for seats in the cabin.

Correct, there's a video explaining it on YouTube. (I suspect you may have seen the same one).

According to whistleblower statements quoted on Pprune forums, it seems that the bolts were removed on the Final Assembly Line in order to open the plug and replace a pressure seal, but there is no record in Boeing documentation that the bolts were subsequently confirmed reinstalled. Reportedly the quality system only required a repeat inspection if the plug had been removed, not if it had just been opened. And the plug was normally referred to as a "door" on the shop floor - doors do not require inspection after opening and closing.

I've only read snippets, but these accounts paint a picture of complete chaos, frankly.... Just what you don't want on an aircraft assembly line!
 

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Southwest Airlines has taken the Boeing 737 Max 7 out of its fleet plans as regulators haven’t yet certified the smallest model of the manufacturer’s bestselling plane.
Southwest became the latest of the major airlines this week to rethink its fleet plans because of certification delays at Boeing. Earlier this week, United Airlines said it was removing the 737 Max 10, the largest model of the Max family, from its internal fleet plans after delays with certification.
Scrutiny on Boeing has mounted in recent weeks after a door panel blew out midflight from a 737 Max 9 that was operated by Alaska Airlines on Jan. 5, prompting the Federal Aviation Administration to ground that model. The FAA on Wednesday cleared inspection instructions to allow the planes to return to service as early as this week.Southwest said in a quarterly earnings and outlook report on Thursday that it expects to receive 79 aircraft this year and that it was removing the Max 7 from its plans “due to Boeing’s continued supply chain challenges and the current status of the -7 certification” down from a contracted 85 aircraft.
FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker told CNBC earlier this week that even before the Alaska Airlines incident, the agency had concluded it needed a more “hands-on approach” with the certification of the Max 7 and Max 10 aircraft. He said the agency has no timelines for those aircraft certifications. As I prepared for this job and went through the nomination and confirmation and really did a deep dive into what happened with the Max originally, I think the message was extra vigilance,” said Whitaker, who is about three months into the FAA’s top job. “So we had already teed up greater visibility in our front office on what these certification programs are, just to have a better understanding of what’s coming. I think that higher level of vigilance is going to remain.”
The FAA late Wednesday said it will bar Boeing from planned production increases of the 737 Max, which could lead to delivery delays for airlines.
The company said in statement after the FAA’s announcement that it “will continue to cooperate fully and transparently with the FAA and follow their direction as we take action to strengthen safety and quality at Boeing.”


Just more bad news for Boeing. I'm surprised we haven't heard anything about the 777-9 from someone like Sir Tim Clark of Emirates. Southwest does have the option to upgrade to the 737-8 if 737-7 delays become too long or if Boeing outright cancels the program but Southwest ordered 100 737-7s in August 2023 so they clearly have faith in the program. One thing this saga has shown us, is that this saga is far from over for Boeing, its only the end of the beginning.


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AlastairFraser

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Once they’re confident in its safety and reliability I think they’ll ramp up C919 production to a large scale. It’s a very capable aircraft and one with a large market potential, especially with Boeing having issues with the MAX and Airbus not having capacity to build planes for everyone.

The Embraer E2 Jets haven’t sold very well. KLM have them but few others have, most of the previous Embraer customers have gone for the A220 instead.
They may be able to ramp it up - but where are they getting reliable engines from? I understand the indigenous engine is still some way off mass production.
As for your point about the E19x-2 series - yes, they haven't sold well until now, but the 737 MAX scandals provide a good reasons for carriers to switch, especially in light of the A220 backlog.
 

DanNCL

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They may be able to ramp it up - but where are they getting reliable engines from? I understand the indigenous engine is still some way off mass production.
The C919 uses the CFM LEAP which is already in mass production and in reliable use on the A320neo and indeed the 737 MAX. The engine with issues on the A320neo is the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G.
 

AlastairFraser

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The C919 uses the CFM LEAP which is already in mass production and in reliable use on the A320neo and indeed the 737 MAX. The engine with issues on the A320neo is the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G.
I thought they were no longer permitted to use that engine due to sanctions?
 

AlastairFraser

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There were attempts to sanction it but ultimately they were unsuccessful and CFM can still export engines to COMAC.
Your posts make a lot more sense now, thank you.
I still think Embraer will see a lot of orders in the short term from airlines that need to replace older jets and don't want 737 MAXs/can't get any Airbuses in a reasonable timeframe.

GE has expressed interest in supplying an engine for the proposed A220-500 which could fit on the A220 models and E2.
How long till production?
 
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YorkRailFan

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How long till production?
Airbus has said that the A220-500 (sometimes referenced as the A221) is "a matter of when not if" but hasn't said when production will begin, Airbus doesn't want the A220-500 to cannabilise the A320neo, even though A320neo orders have peaked as the A321neo have skyrocketed and A320neo orders are slowing. That doesn't make the A320neo a mistake, it was by all means a great move by Airbus, its just the A321neo is outselling the A320neo.
 

YorkRailFan

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Jan 24 (Reuters) - United Airlines (UAL.O), opens new tab said on Wednesday that it has received a final approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to return its fleet of Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab 737 MAX 9's to service and scheduled service would start beginning Sunday.

Haven't seen United contact Boeing (at least publicly) for compensation due to the groundings as of yet.

Alaska Air paid the price for operating an exclusively Boeing fleet after the latest 737 Max safety crisis. Now it wants the manufacturer to honor its debts.Alaska Airlines plans to hold Boeing accountable for every penny the carrier lost following what nearly was the first fatal U.S. commercial aviation accident in 15 years.The company grounded its entire fleet of Boeing 737 Max 9 aircraft earlier this month to ensure none of the other 64 planes would lose parts of their fuselage in mid-air after a door plug on Alaska’s Flight 1282 blew off at 16,000 feet.

In a conference call with analysts, finance chief Shane Tackett estimated shareholders would suffer a minimum $150 million hit to profits this quarter incurred from rebooking passengers and paying overtime to staff.

“We fully expect to be made whole for the profit impact of the grounding,” Tackett vowed to investors in comments reported by the Seattle Times. During its safety inspections, Alaska Air discovered loose bolts on other 737 Max 9 aircraft. Nevertheless, the carrier expects all 65 planes will be back in full service by the end of next week.

The scandal is particularly painful for Alaska given it operates an exclusively Boeing fleet. Most other competitors also have other narrow-body planes like the Airbus A320 in their fleet.

Boeing did not respond to a Fortune request for comment, but chief executive Dave Calhoun has accepted responsibility for Flight 1282’s near disaster. The CEO himself owes his job to a previous scandal that felled his predecessor after faulty 737 Max flight software cost the lives of hundreds of people in October 2018 and March 2019.

Making matters worse for Calhoun, earlier this week the wheel of a Boeing 757 came off a Delta flight departing Atlanta. No one was fortunately injured.

‘We had a guardian angel,’ admits Alaska Air CEO
Now the boss of United Airlines, which operates the largest fleet of 737 Max 9s, appears to have had enough with the scandals at Boeing. His team would look to its rivals to supply the carrier with a replacement for the Max 10 planes he has had on order.

“The Max 9 grounding is probably the straw that broke the camel’s back for us,” United CEO Scott Kirby said this week. “We’re going to build a plan that doesn’t have the Max 10 in it.”

On Thursday, CEO Ben Minicucci told the Today show he was in no doubt that the aircraft that departed Portland that fateful January day came off Boeing’s assembly line defective. Were it not for the quick thinking of the crew and the fact that no one was sitting next to faulty door plug, his customers might have lost their lives.

“There were only seven open seats,” Minicucci told the broadcaster. “We had a guardian angel, honestly, on that airplane.”



Boeing doesn't exactly have a choice but to pay Alaska the compensation, either they pay Alaska now or Alaska takes Boeing to Court and as Alaska has an extremely compelling case, Alaska would likely win the court case.
 

najaB

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How long till production?
Last I heard, Airbus had kicked the idea of the A220-500 into touch. They're focusing on getting the production rate of the base model up to six to ten frames a month.

Which is a shame because both Air France and Delta have said they'd buy tons of them if they were available.
 

AlastairFraser

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Last I heard, Airbus had kicked the idea of the A220-500 into touch. They're focusing on getting the production rate of the base model up to six to ten frames a month.

Which is a shame because both Air France and Delta have said they'd buy tons of them if they were available.
To be fair, if they have a lot on their plate already, they need to be careful not to overstretch themselves. I think this is partly the situation that Boeing has got themselves in.
 

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